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Sixteenth-Century La Florida 
(Under the direction of Kathleen DuVal) 
Although scholars have examined the interactions between the Hernando de Soto expedition and 
the Native elite who governed the hierarchical chiefdoms of La Florida, oft-overlooked Native 
commoners were foundational to this early Spanish imperial effort. Native commoners often 
constructed the spaces of contact between the expedition and local peoples. As guides to an army 
fully unfamiliar with the region, Native commoners determined the social spaces in which the 
Spaniards existed, influencing where the expedition traveled, with whom it interacted, and how 
this interaction transpired. Aware of Spanish reliance on Native knowledge of the region, other 
Native commoners described space in the abstract as a means to manipulate the expedition. 
Because the de Soto expedition generally acted as a destabilizing presence, Native commoners 
also possessed the capacity to uphold the security of their own province and undermine the 
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Spanish conquistador Hernando de Soto and his army christened him Pedro, but they 
referred to him as Perico, a diminutive that hinted at his youth. Perico had been among the nearly 
two hundred men captured near the settlement of Napetuca, where a Native army had staged an 
attack to recoup their leader, or mico, Caliquen, whom the Spaniards had taken prisoner.1 While 
most of the men at Napetuca had been put to death, Perico and a few others were permitted to 
live, under the assumption that they would make fitting servants because of their youth. Taken 
from Caliquen’s province to the province of Apalache, Perico wintered with the Spaniards near 
the shore of the Gulf of Mexico. Repeated attacks from the people of Apalache during that 
winter might have inspired fear in Perico—would he find himself an unwitting victim of these 
people? Or, perhaps Perico desperately hoped that his Spanish captors would be subjected to the 
same fate that they had inflicted upon his comrades at Napetuca.2 
As the winter of 1539 turned to spring, the Spaniards remained undecided about the 
future of their travels across the continent. It was then that Perico came forward with an offer 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 In this paper, the members of the Hernando de Soto expedition will be referred to as Spaniards. While the majority 
of these men were from Spain, de Soto’s army also included men from Portugal, France, and Italy. Many possessed 
“powerful bonds of locality and kinship,” as they originated from the same region or had familial connections to a 
number of other men who participated in the expedition. The expedition participants would have identified closely 
with these more local origins. See: Charles M. Hudson, Knights of Spain, Warriors of the Sun: Hernando de Soto 
and the South’s Ancient Chiefdoms (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1997), 48-9. 
2 Elvas (Gentleman from), “The Account by a Gentleman from Elvas.” In The De Soto Chronicles: The Expedition 
of Hernando de Soto to North America in 1539–1543, vol. 1, eds. Lawrence A. Clayton, Vernon James Knight Jr., 
and Edward C. Moore (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1993), 74; Rodrigo Ranjel, “Account of the 
Northern Conquest and Discovery of Hernando de Soto,” in The De Soto Chronicles: The Expedition of Hernando 
de Soto to North America in 1539–1543, vol. 1, eds. Lawrence A. Clayton, Vernon James Knight Jr., and Edward C. 
Moore (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1993), 267-8. 
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that the gold-hungry de Soto could hardly refuse. Likely with the assistance of Juan Ortiz, a 
former Spanish castaway who had spent over a decade among the Timucuan-speaking peoples of 
Ucita and Mocoço before joining de Soto’s expedition, Perico informed the Spaniards that he 
was not of Napetuca like the other captives. He described himself as a traveler of the continent, a 
visitor from a far-away chiefdom called Cofitachequi. He wove tales of his homeland, which was 
ruled by a woman who lived in a large, wealthy settlement. She acquired tribute from the many 
chiefdoms subordinate to her. This tribute included a wealth of gold, Perico was careful to 
emphasize, which the people of Cofitachequi would mine, melt, and refine for their chieftainess. 
Perico’s story must have sounded almost too good to be true—a youth, who had been among 
their ranks for months, suddenly becomes willing to share knowledge of a distant land which 
possessed in abundance exactly what the Spaniards were searching for. Could the Spaniards 
believe him? They eventually decided in the affirmative, reasoning that Perico’s story was too 
detailed to be based on lies. De Soto’s desire to obtain gold, a metal which had been abundant in 
his previous expeditions but which had thus far eluded him in La Florida, added to his 
willingness to believe Perico’s story. De Soto made his decision, and the army started off for the 
interior of the continent, led by the young Perico.3 
 Although convincing to Hernando de Soto’s army in 1540, Perico’s story should raise 
questions for the modern reader. Why, exactly, would Perico lead the army of Spaniards, whom 
he had seen devastate the people of Napetuca, to his homeland? Was this instead an elaborate 
ruse, meant to ensnare the Spaniards with promises of riches while placing Perico in a position of 
relative privilege within their ranks? Perico’s motivations likely aligned much more closely with 
the latter. However, despite indications to the contrary, scholars of the de Soto expedition have 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Elvas, 74; Ranjel, 267-9. 
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failed to interrogate Perico’s motivations, just as Hernando de Soto did. This failure reflects a 
more general dearth in the scholarship on the Native peoples of the region that Spain called La 
Florida, which encompassed not only the modern-day state of Florida but also most of the 
modern-day southeastern United States, in the years following European contact. Much of the 
existing work on the Hernando de Soto expedition focuses on reconstructing the expedition’s 
route rather than offering insights into the social and political organization of the indigenous 
people of the region. Scholarship that places greater focus on the indigenous people with whom 
the expedition interacted still presupposes Spanish conquistadors and Native elite as the primary 
actors. Such scholarship does not consider the significance of Native commoners both in 
expeditions and to the region more generally.4 The hierarchical nature of both Native and 
Spanish society, coupled with a sparse archaeological and historical record, explains this trend. 
The Spanish men who penned the records of early cross-cultural interactions interpreted La 
Florida through their own hierarchical worldview, and they were more inclined to recognize the 
significance of Native elite. 
This scholarly focus on Native elite also derives from La Florida’s hierarchical social 
organization. From approximately 750 to 950 CE, the population of the Southeast increased 
significantly, intensifying reliance on agricultural production (which in turn allowed for further 
population increases) and promoting a shift away from smaller-scale social organization in favor 
of centralization.5 Although not universal, the resulting centralized chiefdoms, characteristic of 
what archaeologists have labeled the Mississippian cultural tradition, spread across the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 For an example of the former trend, see: Charles M. Hudson’s Knights of Spain, Warriors of the Sun: Hernando de 
Soto and the South’s Ancient Chiefdoms. For an example of the latter trend, see: Kathleen DuVal’s The Native 
Ground: Indians and Colonists in the Heart of the Continent (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006). 
5 Christina Snyder, Slavery in Indian Country: The Changing Face of Captivity in Early America (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 2010), 14; Vincas P. Steponaitis, Ceramics, Chronology, and Community Patterns 
(Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2009), 170-1. 
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Southeast.6 Mississippian chiefdoms bordered the somewhat less expansive Timucuan chiefdoms 
of the Florida peninsula, the centralization of which was limited by the presence of less arable 
land.7 Southeastern chiefdoms were hierarchical, rank-based societies that were regional in 
nature. A chiefdom included elite, commoners, and slaves. A chief, or mico, might rule his own 
town as well as a number of other towns that were subordinate to him, usually those falling 
within a day’s travel of the chiefdom’s geographic center.8  A mico obtained power through 
descent from a ruling lineage, and certain individuals connected to the mico through this lineage 
held noble political offices within the chiefdom.9   
That micos performed high profile activities within their chiefdoms also helps explain the 
scholarly focus on Native elite. Descended from elite lineages, micos claimed their power in part 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Robbie Franklin Ethridge, “Introduction: Mapping the Mississippian Shatter Zone,” in Mapping the Mississippian 
Shatter Zone, eds. Robbie Franklin Ethridge and Sheri Shuck Hall (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2009), 3; 
Hudson, 27-8; John Worth, The Timucuan Chiefdoms of Spanish Florida: Assimilation (Gainesville: University of 
Florida Press, 1998), 6-8. 
7 To archaeologists, Timucuan chiefdoms are considered “variations on a broader Southeastern theme,” as they 
possess the social organization of rank-ordered chiefdoms but generally lack the elaborate mound tradition and 
extensive ritual material culture associated with Mississippian sites. John Worth suggests that Timucuan chiefdoms 
likely lacked the temporal stability or close-knit structure of Mississippian chiefdoms. Instead, these chiefdoms 
constituted small-scale chiefdoms. See: Worth 1998, 13, 17-8. However, the boundary between the Timucuan and 
Mississippian categorizations remains an issue of continued debate. See:.John H. Hann, A History of Timucua 
Indians and Missions (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1996), 28.  
8 The Native societies of the Southeast at the outset of contact have been described as: “rank societies, meaning that 
social status and political power are determined by genealogical nearness to a single noble family lineage from 
which the heirs to the principal chief’s office are always drawn.” Generally, this lineage would have been 
determined through the mother, given the matrilineal nature of these societies. See: Worth 1998, 5. See also: Jon 
Muller, Mississippian Political Economy (New York: Springer, 1997), 156-7; Steponaitis, 1. Most Mississippian 
chiefdoms had a radius of approximately 25 miles at maximum. These societies are characterized as complex 
chiefdoms, and they incorporated a number of subordinate simple chiefdoms. Paramount chiefdoms also existed. 
Paramount chiefdoms generally connected complex chiefdoms through a tribute system, which was most likely quite 
temporary. See: Worth 1998, 10.  
Micos were usually men. However, if a ruling matrilineage did not have a male heir, a mico’s niece inherited the 
position (such as in Cofitachequi). To reflect this trend, this paper will use the male pronoun when discussing a 
hypothetical mico. See: Worth 1998, 9. 
9 Vernon Knight, “Social Organization and the Evolution of Hierarchy in Southeastern Chiefdoms,” Journal of 
Anthropological Research 46, 1 (1990): 18-19. 
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through their inherent connections to the sacred.10 Within many southeastern chiefdoms, micos 
situated their lodgings atop manmade mounds, literally positioning themselves closer to the sun, 
the spiritual force from which their authority was said to derive, and physically above their 
subordinates11 Consequently, a mico’s ability to control his surroundings, whether human or 
environmental, both reinforced and was reinforced by sacred connections.12 These performances 
of authority were also central to maintaining control of resources and subordinates. Subordinates 
within a settlement would provide their mico a portion of their agricultural products and prestige 
goods, and the mico would then provide his superior a portion of this tribute. The receiving mico 
could control the disbursement of these goods. While a mico might redistribute provisions to his 
subjects, the mico also might use these resources to maintain or establish diplomatic 
relationships. Similarly, micos could directly control the labor of their subordinates, such as 
using laborers to create the elaborate mounds characteristic of Mississippian cultures.13 The 
capacity to control and distribute resources and labor was also foundational to success in the 
endemic warfare that characterized the Southeast, as a mico needed to obtain control of and 
provide for enough subjects to pose a military threat. 14 However, the purpose of this warfare was 
less to gain more territory than to exert control over more subjects and resources either directly 
or by establishing access to new trade routes, thus extending the reach of a mico’s authority.15  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Ethridge, “Introduction,” 4; Snyder, 16, 22. 
11 Matthew H. Jennings, “Violence in a Shattered World,” in Mapping the Mississippian Shatter Zone, eds. Robbie 
Franklin Ethridge and Sheri Shuck Hall (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2009), 273; Snyder, 2-3. 
12 Snyder, 2-3. 
13 Snyder, 24. 
14 Archaeological evidence, such as a tendency for palisaded towns to exist on the outskirts of chiefdoms, suggests 
that warfare was endemic among the chiefdoms in this region. See: Ethridge, “Introduction,” 6. 
15 Jennings, 275; Snyder, 30. 
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Since the 1960s, historians have recognized the importance of writing histories from the 
bottom up, or writing histories that demonstrate the significance of groups that previous scholars 
considered powerless. Analyses of these seemingly powerless groups have revealed that these 
groups often had some power, and thus such scholarship has challenged existing interpretations 
of societies.16  A bottom-up approach is similarly useful for understanding the Native societies of 
La Florida. While exogamous marriage practices meant that certain commoners could be 
incorporated into noble lineages through marriage, commoners still comprised the demographic 
majorities of southeastern chiefdoms, meaning that polities consisted of the rule of the many by 
the few.17 Thus, power within chiefdoms was coercive, as the capacity to coerce subordinates 
was foundational to the maintenance or enhancement of micos’ authority.18 Yet this recognition 
has not yet been adequately translated into an examination of interactions with coercive power—
those over whom power was exercised were capable of negotiating or even subverting these 
power dynamics.  
The Hernando de Soto expedition offers an ideal lens through which to pursue an inquiry 
of Native commoners in La Florida, defined here as the modern-day states of Florida, Georgia, 
and South Carolina (or, in terminology more appropriate for the chronology of this paper, but 
less familiar to a contemporary readership, the region bounded by the chiefdom of Ucita to the 
South, Apalache to the west, and Cofitachequi to the northeast), as it constituted the most 
invasive Spanish presence in the region prior to permanent settlement in 1565.19 Using accounts 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Some of the first scholars to write history from the bottom up include: E.P. Thompson, Jesse L. Lemisch, 
Staughton Lynd, and Howard Zinn. This work is indebted to scholars who have demonstrated the effectiveness of 
this approach in the context of Spanish colonialism, including Cynthia Radding, Karen Spaulding, and Steve Stern, 
among others. 
17 Worth 1998, 9. 
18 Ethridge, “Introduction,” 6-7, Jennings, 273. 
19 See: Appendix for a map of the expedition’s likely route. 
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from participants in the de Soto expedition, this paper traces the route of the expedition through 
La Florida, focusing on the often-fleeting personal encounters between Native commoners and 
the Spaniards.20 These encounters offer a momentary window into how Native commoners made 
sense of Spanish incursion. Because Native commoners’ worldviews informed their reactions to 
Spanish presence, these encounters also can reveal the internal dynamics of Native societies in a 
manner otherwise inaccessible.21  
Taken captive and integrated into the expedition as guides, emissaries, or servants, Native 
commoners served as intermediaries between the Spaniards and the chiefdoms of the region. 
Hernando de Soto hoped to “conquer, pacify, and populate” La Florida, a power granted to him 
by the Spanish Crown.22 Yet he was fully unfamiliar with the region, and his efforts to translate 
his power in the abstract into a meaningful imperial presence required him to rely heavily upon 
Native knowledge.23 Thus, Native commoners generally served as the means through which the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 There are three main accounts of the De Soto expedition, and they serve as the primary source base for this 
analysis. Rodrigo Ranjel acted as De Soto’s personal secretary, and his account is preserved in fragments in Spanish 
historian Gonzalo Fernández de Oviedo y Valdés’ Historia general y natural de las Indias. Luys Hernández de 
Biedma served as factor to the expedition, overseeing and administering Crown property. His position also likely 
required that he maintain an official account of the expedition’s movements, which served as a foundation for his 
published account, Relación de la Isla de La Florida. The third account was written by an anonymous man from 
Elvas, Portugal, who participated in the expedition. For debates on the utility of these accounts, see: Patricia 
Galloway, “The Incestuous Soto Narratives” in The Hernando De Soto Expedition History, Historiography, and 
"Discovery" in the Southeast; Charles Hudson, “Afterward”; Ida Altman, “An Official’s Report: The Hernandez de 
Biedma Account,” in The Hernando De Soto Expedition History, Historiography, and "Discovery" in the Southeast, 
ed. Patricia Galloway (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1997). 
21 For discussions of the usefulness of a more microhistorical approach in elucidating macrohistorical processes, see: 
Carlo Ginzburg, “Microhistory: Two or Three Things That I Know About It,” Critical Inquiry 20,1 (1993); 
Giovanni Levi, “On Microhistory,” in New Perspectives on Historical Writing, ed. Peter Burke (College Park: Penn 
State University Press, 2001); Matti Peltonen, “Clues, Margins, and Monads: The Micro-Macro Link in Historical 
Research,” History and Theory 40 (2001); István Szijáró, “Four Arguments for Microhistory,” Rethining History 6,2 
(2002). 
22 Buckingham Smith, “Selected Items from Narratives of the Career of Hernando de Soto in the Conquest of 
Florida,” in The De Soto Chronicles: The Expedition of Hernando de Soto to North America in 1539–1543, vol. 1, 
eds. Lawrence A. Clayton, Vernon James Knight Jr., and Edward C. Moore (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama 
Press, 1993), 360. 
23 Like De Soto’s imperial efforts, empire more generally is constructed through local experience. See: Linda 
Colley, Captives: Britain, Empire and the World, 1600-1850 (New York: Random House, 2010); Joshua Piker, 
“Lying Together: The Imperial Implications of Cross-Cultural Untruths,” American Historical Review 116,4 (2011); 
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Spaniards gained access to settlements and fields, spaces that provided them the resources 
necessary for their continued survival in La Florida. Because de Soto aspired not only to survive 
but also to establish a permanent presence, access to these spaces, and the physical and human 
resources within them, could also serve as a means for De Soto to gain a foundation of power in 
the region.  
However, Native commoners did not simply acquiesce to Spanish demands. As guides, 
emissaries, and advisers to the expedition, commoners often subverted Spanish interests, using 
Spanish ignorance to their own advantage.24 Frequently, Native commoners undermined Spanish 
access both to physical spaces and to the knowledge of spaces. For example, as guides, Native 
commoners could exploit the Spaniards’ unfamiliarity with the region to misdirect them, 
working to deny the Spaniards access to the spaces they desired and to the resources within those 
spaces. Commoners also subverted the expedition’s goals by manipulating the Spaniards’ access 
to knowledge of the region. For example, Native commoners might use their descriptions of 
spaces in the abstract to manipulate the Spaniards’ travels, as Perico did when describing 
Cofitachequi to de Soto. Rather than acting to the benefit of the Spaniards, Native commoners 
worked to further their own interests. 
Native commoners also had unprecedented opportunities to either challenge or augment 
the power of their leaders through their interactions with the de Soto expedition. De Soto desired 
to gain power in the region at the expense of micos, which he demonstrated through his tendency 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Kathleen Wilson, The Island Race: Englishness, Empire, and Gender in the Eighteenth Century (New York: 
Routledge, 2003). 
24 The current generation of scholarship on Indian history has come to recognize that, despite European imperial 
presence, Native people dominated on much of the continent into the nineteenth century, particularly in regions 
labeled imperial borderlands. See: Juliana Barr, Peace Came in the Form of a Woman: Indians and Spaniards in the 
Texas Borderlands (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2007); Kathleen DuVal, Native Ground: 
Indians and Colonists in the Heart of the Continent (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006); Pekka 
Hamalainen, The Comanche Empire (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008); Jon Parmenter, The Edge of the 
Woods: Iroquoia, 1534-1701 (Lansing: Michigan State University Press). 
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to raid and dismantle settlements, capture nobles, forcibly extract resources, and engage in slave 
raiding. Although Native spaces were constantly changing, shaped by dynamic cultures and 
environments, the de Soto expedition could prove particularly destabilizing to Native spaces and 
the resources housed within them. By destabilizing spaces, the expedition could challenge the 
foundations of a mico’s power. Commoners, who often served as the means through which the 
expedition accessed Native spaces, consequently influenced the stability of their leaders’ power 
through their interactions with the Spaniards. 
The decisions that Native commoners made when the de Soto expedition intersected with 
their lives were deeply rooted in the Native world that was La Florida. Each commoner was 
informed by his or her own position within their society, such as rank or gender. For example, a 
woman might draw on the authority she possessed within a matrilineal social system to entreat 
others to assist her in preventing the de Soto expedition from reaching a province. Or a man who 
had been taken captive by an enemy province might assist the expedition in undermining the 
power of the leader to whom he was now enslaved. Simultaneously, commoners’ decisions were 
informed by their understandings of relationships among provinces. For example, a commoner 
might describe an adversarial province as abounding with provisions and gold as a means to 
convince the expedition to travel there. Hardly powerless, Native commoners could both 






CHAPTER 1: Ucita 
The four Native men had been taken from their homes near the gulf coast and forced onto 
a ship by strangers who spoke an unintelligible language.25 As the men traveled south into open 
waters, the gravity of their predicament must have weighed on them. Would they ever return to 
their homes? Or would they always remain captives in another’s land? Before their capture, the 
men might have been tasked with spying on the small group of Spaniards whose ships had 
appeared off the coast. Or they might have been members of a war party that had been bested in 
a skirmish with the Spaniards after the visitors made landfall to reconnoiter the area around the 
port. In the days after the Native men’s disappearance, the specter of transitory foreign presence 
must have haunted La Florida’s coastal people. In a month, the ships reappeared off the coast, 
this time with an entire entrada in tow, prepared for a more extended tenure on the continent.  
These captive men were the first of many Native people living near La Florida’s gulf 
coast to encounter the de Soto expedition. Here, local people attempted to undermine the 
expedition during its first days on the continent. Individuals taken captive and tasked with 
guiding the expedition through unfamiliar territory repeatedly misdirected the Spaniards, 
exploiting Spanish reliance on indigenous knowledge. As a result, these captives denied the 
Spaniards access to the settlements and resources they desired. Even captives given freely by
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25Juan de Añasco led an abbreviated expedition to reconnoiter a port the month prior to the arrival of the full 
expedition.  See: Ranjel, 254. Ranjel says four men were captured, while Elvas says two were captured. Given the 
number of captives discussed later in the narratives, Ranjel’s number appears most accurate. See: Ranjel, 254; Elvas, 
56. 
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their mico, who hoped to ingratiate himself with Hernando de Soto to increase his regional 
power, refused to cooperate with the Spaniards. Their actions demonstrate that Native 
commoners were willing to act in their own personal interest, even if they undermined the 
interests of their leader. 
***** 
Both recent and more distant memories of Spanish interaction informed local 
interpretations of the return of these ships. The recent disappearance of the four young men made 
the Spanish ships a greater cause for alarm. However, locals also might have harbored some 
hope that their disappeared kin would return with the ships.26 More recent negative interactions 
aside, that Spaniards had previously proven a difficult and even dangerous presence in the region 
would have shaped responses to Spanish return. Hardly more than a decade prior, the ill-fated 
Pánfilo de Narváez expedition made landfall near this location.27 The Narváez expedition had 
taken captives and exploited resources from the region. The expedition had also undermined the 
local people’s spiritual practices, burning the remains of a Spanish shipwreck that locals had 
respectfully interred. Rather than risk further conflict with the Narváez expedition, the local 
Native people had distracted the Spaniards with promises of wealth in a far-off province, 
successfully removing this source of instability from their homeland.28   
Given these histories, the sight of the ships was sufficient to initiate a chain of inter-
settlement communication that would prime the local people for impending Spanish arrival and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Elvas, 57; Ranjel, 254. 
27 While the actual site of the Narváez expedition’s landfall has not been definitively determined, evidence suggests 
that it was most likely Sarasota Bay. For more information, see: Andrés Resendez, A Land So Strange: The Epic 
Journey of Cabeza de Vaca (New York: Basic Books, 2007), note 26 of Ch. 3. De Soto also landed in nearby south 
Tampa Bay. See: Hudson. 
28 Ålvar Núñez Cabeza de Vaca, “The 1542 Relación of Ålvar Núñez Cabeza de Vaca,” in Ålvar Núñez Cabeza de 
Vaca: Volume 1, eds. Rolena Adorno and Patrick Charles Pautz (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1999), 37-9. 
See also: Resendez, Ch. 3. 
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ideally provide them time to strategically plan their responses.29 When the ships came within 
sight of land, the locals initiated a chain of smoke signals that were then reproduced along the 
coast.30 Ålvar Núñez Cabeza de Vaca’s account of the Narváez expedition’s landfall near this 
area include no mention of such far-reaching smoke signaling, suggesting that coastal smoke 
signaling might have been an adaptive response by these people in light of the new dangers of 
Spanish presence.31 These smoke signals were likely supplemented by scouting parties and 
runners, such as the men taken captive during the de Soto expedition’s initial reconnaissance 
mission. Prior warning provided the people of Ucita, the settlement nearest to the port, sufficient 
time to prepare for Spanish arrival. When a party of Spaniards inadvertently discovered the 
settlement while scouting near the coast, Ucita’s residents had already uprooted themselves and 
abandoned their settlement.32 The residents, whether at the behest of their mico or on their own 
accord, had made the measured decision that the risk of occupation or destruction of their village 
was an appealing alternative to an encounter with the visitors. Such abandonment was hardly a 
novel practice for the people of this region, but instead a response rooted in longstanding 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 For a mico to successfully exert authority within the boundaries of his territory and to be aware of the goings-on 
in other territories, he needed to possess efficient networks through which to obtain information. Because these 
networks were often invisible to European observers, they can be difficult to reconstruct with available documentary 
sources. Yet Europeans often found themselves contending with, and sometimes disadvantaged by, the information 
that these networks could distribute. However, as Alejandra Dubcovsky has argued, attempting to elucidate the 
functioning of these networks, instead of merely assuming their existence, is central to understanding power 
relations within a region. See: Alejandra Dubcovsky, “One Hundred Sixty-One Knots, Two Plates, and One 
Emperor: Creek Information Networks in the Era of the Yamasee War” Ethnohistory 59, 3 (2012); Worth 1998, 12-
3. 
30 While there is no direct evidence of similar communication methods in response to the earlier reconnaissance 
mission, it is not unlikely that local people would have responded similarly to this initial evidence of Spanish 
presence. See: Elvas, 257. 
31 Cabeza de Vaca does not include any reference to inter-settlement smoke signaling in response to Spanish arrival. 
See: Cabeza de Vaca, 35-9. 
32 Elvas, 57; Ranjel, 254. 
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practices. When the Narváez expedition first made landfall ten years prior, local people similarly 
abandoned their settlements in preparation for Spanish arrival.33 
While the people of Ucita were ensuring that the Spaniards did not access any human 
resources from their settlement, the four men who had been captured a month prior were intent 
on denying the expedition further access to Ucita. When a second Spanish contingent 
disembarked to join the first contingent at Ucita, the four Native captives were among them. 
Once again in their homeland but under the most undesirable of circumstance, they were 
unwillingly employed as guides. Able to communicate with one another in a language no 
Spaniard understood, the men acted thoroughly confused by the numerous roads that crossed the 
forest, seemingly unsure of which to take despite having been captured very near this location 
only a month prior. Because they deferred to the guides’ presumed knowledge of the region, the 
Spaniards were quite at the whim of their guides within this unfamiliar space. Eventually, 
however, the Native guides’ performed incompetence convinced the Spaniards to place their own 
men in command of guiding the contingent. This reaction made irrelevant Native knowledge of 
the area, forcing the Spaniards to make sense of fully unfamiliar territory. Yet removing even the 
most resistant guides seemed to further slow the progress of the Spaniards. The four captives 
surely watched with satisfaction as the Spaniards struggled through a landscape fraught with 
swamps, exhausting their horses and temporarily weakening the members of the contingent.34 
However, the contingent eventually reached Ucita, and if the guides were residents of 
that settlement, they might have been dismayed at the extent to which the Spaniards had decided 
to make themselves at home there. De Soto and other high-ranking men within the expedition 
had housed themselves in many of the elite homes, which were situated atop a mound at one side 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 Cabeza de Vaca, 35. 
34 Ranjel, 254. 
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of the village, and they stored the provisions that they had removed from their ships in the 
remaining elite structures.35 These actions must have appeared a striking upheaval of the social 
order, even if the mico of Ucita did not possess the power or regional dominance of his northern 
counterparts. The guides also might have watched as the Spaniards took to dismantling the more 
modest wooden buildings in which the commoners of the settlement lived, using the components 
to rebuild structures more in line with Spanish sensibilities. Among the buildings the Spaniards 
tore down was the settlement’s temple, a large structure that was positioned atop a mound across 
from the mico’s houses—a spatial parallel that reinforced the sacred origins of the mico’s 
authority.36 To the guides, the physical dismantling of the temple, coupled with Hernando de 
Soto’s occupation of the elite residences, must have seemed a challenge not only to the mico’s 
dominance within his settlement, but also to the sacred connections his lineage was supposed to 
possess. 
Now that their captors had settled on the continent, the four captive men soon exploited 
Spanish unfamiliarity with the region as a means to secure their freedom and to further deny the 
Spaniards access to any local knowledge they might possess. One captive man was directed to 
invite neighboring micos to meet with Hernando de Soto at Ucita-cum-Spanish camp.37 
Considering the guides had pretended themselves fully confused in their previous efforts, this 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Within southeastern chiefdoms, space often reinforced and reproduced social hierarchy in a manner that 
maintained elite authority, such as an elite lineage raising platform mounds each time a new mico came to power, or 
an elite lineage ensuring that elite homes and temples were physically higher than the homes of subordinates. The 
construction of platform mounds within these chiefdoms “served to reinforce and affirm the traditional social 
ranking (and associated inequalities) associated with Mississippian chiefdoms,” acting as “physical symbols of 
social rank, providing through their height a visual reminder not only of distinction in status but also the 
generational time-depth of noble matrilineages and the hereditary succession of the chiefly office.” The capacity of 
the mounds to reinforce the depth of a lineage’s ruling power existed because, in the succession from one chief to 
another, the structures atop the mounds were burned and rebuilt on an added layer of earth to emphasize the 
continuation of the lineage’s rule. See: Worth 1998, 12. 
36 Elvas, 57-8. 
37 Ranjel, 255. 
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man must have either convinced the Spaniards that he was familiar with this space and would be 
able to help them locate local leaders, or the Spaniards, unsure of what lay outside Ucita, were in 
a desperate enough situation that they were willing to rely on anyone who might have some 
knowledge of the land. Indeed, one Spanish chronicler wrote that, “there were some roads, but 
no one knew or guessed which they should take in order to find the natives of the land.” The 
records make no more mention of the emissary, suggesting that he was never heard from again. 
He would have possessed little motivation to return to his captors, who could hardly find their 
way through the forest and were unlikely to track him down.38 Soon after, two of the remaining 
captives also escaped the camp, probably no difficult task given that the Spaniards lacked 
shackles with which to bind them.39 The one guide who remained would not stay at Ucita much 
longer, for he was tasked with accompanying one of two Spanish contingents that went in search 
of local leaders, a result of the failure of the first Native emissary to return to his captors. As 
before, the Native guide pretended himself confused, again denying the Spaniards access to any 
potentially useful knowledge he possessed of this space.40   
The guide’s power to exploit Spanish ignorance of the region was soon made irrelevant 
when diplomats representing the mico Mocoço, a neighbor and enemy of Ucita, appeared to 
welcome the Spanish visitors. Although this encounter in the forest proved a surprise for both 
groups, as the Mocoço contingent was traveling on orders to make overtures to the Spaniards at 
their camp at Ucita, the potential for a skirmish was quickly averted when a member of the 
Mocoço contingent revealed himself to be of Spanish origin.41 The captive guide had likely 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 Ranjel, 255. 
39 Elvas 58, Ranjel, 255. 
40 Ranjel, 255. 
41 Biedma, Luys Hernández de, “Relation of the Island of Florida,” in The De Soto Chronicles: The Expedition of 
Hernando de Soto to North America in 1539–1543, vol. 1, eds. Lawrence A. Clayton, Vernon James Knight Jr., and 
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heard of or even met this Spaniard, Juan Ortiz, a castaway from the Narváez expedition who had 
been captured and enslaved by the people of Ucita and later lived as a subordinate to the mico 
Mocoço, spending over a decade on the continent.42  The guide might have been dismayed at the 
arrival of Juan Ortiz, a willing translator who might undermine his extended ruse, which was 
possible in part because of the inability of the parties to communicate effectively. Furthermore, 
although the captive man was surely aware that Mocoço and his subordinates knew of Spanish 
presence from the networks of communication that were initiated as soon as the Spaniards came 
within sight of the coastline, he might have been concerned that Mocoço had made an immediate 
effort to seek out the Spaniards. The captive would have realized that Mocoço sent Juan Ortiz as 
an offering, accompanied by a number of diplomats to convey the mico’s goodwill toward the 
visitors.43 Such an act, besides ingratiating Mocoço with the Spaniards by offering them an 
individual who possessed the communication skills to broach the language gap, was likely also 
an affront to the mico of Ucita. The guide must have realized that Mocoço would have delighted 
at learning that Ucita was uprooted from the spatial center of his chiefdom, as Mocoço had 
burned Ucita’s previous residence only a few years prior.44 Indeed, by offering a person in his 
possession to the Spaniards, the mico Mocoço had successfully gained leverage with the 
expedition, which he later used to emphasize to the Spaniards the evils of his four enemies in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Edward C. Moore (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1993), 225; Elvas, 59; Ranjel, 255. Because Ucita and 
Mocoço do not appear in later Spanish records, it is difficult to determine whether these people of what 
archaeologists have labeled the Safety Harbor cultural tradition spoke a Timucuan language. However, John Hann 
has suggested that the people of Mocoço did speak Timucuan. See: John H. Hann, Indians of Central and South 
Florida 1513-1763 (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 2003). 
42 Ranjel, 255; Elvas, 59-62; Biedma, 225. 
43 Ranjel, 255-6; Elvas, 62-3. 
44 In his account of his experiences as a captive, Ortiz recalls a situation in which Mocoço burned Ucita’s town, 
forcing the mico to relocate. See: Elvas, 61. 
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region, including Ucita.45 The captive might have become even more displeased when Mocoço 
later visited the Spanish camp at Ucita.46 Although the Spaniards’ attempts to keep micos at their 
camp often amounted to kidnapping, Mocoço was more than willing to physically situate himself 
at the former power center of Ucita. The Spaniards’ upheaval of the settlement had aided 
Mocoço’s intentions to gain greater authority in the region at the expense of his adversary. Ucita 
had become a Spanish space, and through Mocoço’s positive relationship with the Spaniards, it 
reflected the breadth of his own regional authority by extension and his hope that Ucita and 
perhaps even the Spaniards would become his subordinates. 
The captive guide lost any future utility to the expedition when Mocoço offered his own 
subordinates as guides, in an effort to enhance his burgeoning alliance with the Spaniards and in 
the interest of undermining his enemies in the region. Without Mocoço’s assistance, the 
Spaniards would have remained thoroughly lost in their surroundings, as Juan Ortiz been 
effectively enslaved and was thus quite unfamiliar with the settlement patterns of the area.47 
Power over knowledge of the region, then, transferred not to Ortiz but to the subordinates of 
Mocoço who guided the expedition around the region, and the Spanish contingents thus 
remained very much at the whim of the Native guides tasked with leading them.  
Because Mocoço wanted to increase his power in the region, he considered it in his 
interest to assist the Spaniards, but this interest did not necessarily translate to the guides he 
provided to the Spaniards. One guide claimed that the people of Ucita were holding a gathering 
at a nearby settlement, and the Spaniards, believing him and hoping to take captives to send as 
slaves to Cuba, allowed him to lead a contingent there. However, the settlement was abandoned, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 Ranjel recalls that these enemy micos were Orriygua, Neguarete, Çapaloey, and Ucita. See: Ranjel, 256. 
46 Ranjel, 256; Elvas, 62-3. 
47 Elvas, 62; Biedma, 226. 
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and the bustling space that the guide had constructed for Spanish imaginations did not comport 
with reality. The guide watched as the Spaniards, angered that this space did not meet their 
expectations, burned the abandoned settlement, perhaps as an act of retaliation against the people 
of Ucita for failing to provide them with the means to slave raid.48 While Spanish confusion 
about guides’ motivations can make it difficult to recreate them, the guide might have possessed 
two distinct reasons for this misdirection. First, he might have had a rapport with the people of 
Ucita and misdirected the Spaniards to preserve the people of Ucita from Spanish violence and 
slave raiding, acting against the interests of both the Spaniards and Mocoço. Or, the guide might 
have wanted to lead the Spaniards to an empty settlement, which would undermine the 
Spaniards’ efforts. Yet because his actions provided the Spaniards access to an Ucitan space, and 
resulted in the physical destruction of the settlement, the guide also challenged a spatial 
foundation of the mico of Ucita’s power. Whatever the guide’s motivations, the Spaniards sensed 
that he had intentionally misdirected them in their attempt to locate a population of Indians for 
capture, and they set their dogs on the guide. The Spanish response not only demonstrates the 
brutality of expedition justice, but also the significance of what the Spaniards recognized as the 
guide’s desire to subvert their goals.49 While the guide never would have known this fact, one 
Spanish captain, who participated in the expedition for the purpose of slaving, soon left the 
continent and returned to Havana, frustrated at his inability to capture sufficient Indians to sell as 
slaves.50 
As the guide was misdirecting the Spaniards in their forays through the province of Ucita, 
another Native man had left Ucita as an emissary to Paracoxi, the superior mico to both Mocoço 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 Ranjel, 257; Biedma, 226. 
49 Ranjel, 257. 
50 Ranjel, 257-8; Elvas, 63-4. 
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and Ucita, whom the Spaniards sought after Juan Ortiz told them stories of Paracoxi’s wealth in 
comparison to the coastal settlements.51 This emissary was tasked with making diplomatic 
overtures to Paracoxi, and he was to travel without Spanish accompaniment as an intermediary 
between the two societies. Before he left, however, a Native woman who was with the expedition 
intercepted the emissary, convincing him to flee instead of assisting the Spaniards in their 
request. That she was able to convince the emissary, who seemingly had intended to carry out his 
task, suggests the capacity of women to employ the status of their gender to their advantage. 
Timucuan people were matrilineal, and given the centrality of women in matrilineal societies, 
this woman might have been able to draw upon the authority she possessed within her social 
system and perhaps also as a progenitor of a lineage intimately connected to that of the 
emissary.52 Considering the Spaniards had twice captured groups of local woman, she might 
have joined the expedition as a captive rather than through any affiliations with Mocoço, a fact 
that might have furthered her interest in undermining the Spanish diplomatic project. At the very 
least, both she and the guide had witnessed the violence the Spaniards were inclined to commit, 
and she might have had an interest in preventing or at least delaying Spanish access to Paracoxi. 
Indeed, heeding the woman’s advice, the emissary took full advantage of his newfound 
independence and simply failed to return to the Spaniards, either remaining at Paracoxi or going 
somewhere else altogether. The Spaniards soon learned of this woman’s role in undermining 
their attempt to send an emissary —perhaps she was not terribly quiet about her distaste for the 
expedition. Angered that she had subverted their communication effort, the Spaniards set their 
dogs on the woman, killing her as they had killed the previous uncooperative guide.53	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 Elvas, 62. 
52 Worth 1998, 87. 
53 Ranjel, 257-9. 
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CHAPTER 2: Paracoxi, Cale, and Potano 
Despite the failure of the emissary to fulfill his task, the people of Paracoxi were surely 
already aware of the unusual party to the south of their chiefdom. They either saw the smoke 
signals that appeared across the coast as soon as Spanish ships became visible over the horizon, 
or they learned of more recent events through runners who made their way from Mocoço’s 
province north to Paracoxi. The people of Paracoxi, as well as those in the neighboring 
chiefdoms of Cale and Potano, used this preexisting knowledge of the expedition to their 
advantage. In both Paracoxi and Cale, Native commoners who were detained or captured by the 
expedition drew on their awareness with the expedition’s goals to successfully manipulate the 
Spaniards’ movement through the region. In Potano, a commoner pretended to be the province’s 
mico, manipulating the Spaniards’ unfamiliarity with the province’s politics to recover residents 
who had been taken captive. In all three cases, by either convincing the Spaniards to leave their 
province or undermining the Spaniards’ captive taking, Native commoners manipulated the 
Spaniards’ reliance on their knowledge to reinforce the power of their micos. Simultaneously, 
and perhaps more importantly, they protected their kin from the violence and destabilization that 
Spanish presence might bring. 
***** 
When a Spanish contingent did reach Paracoxi, the residents attempted to deny the 
Spaniards access to their settlement. Their mico did not respond to Spanish efforts to contact 
him, and a number of the mico’s subordinates, whether at his behest or on their own accord, 
arrived at the Spanish camp rather than allowing the Spaniards to enter their settlement. They 
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informed the Spaniards that their mico was not at home, but that they would kindly pass a 
message to him to ensure that he visited the Spaniards as soon as he returned, again emphasizing 
that they preferred to meet in Spanish space rather than allow the Spaniards to enter theirs. The 
people of Paracoxi also claimed to desire the establishment of an alliance between the two 
parties. The following day, however, the people of Paracoxi arrived at the Spanish encampment 
again, now informing the Spaniards that their mico was ill and could not visit the Spaniards. The 
visitors from Paracoxi might have sensed that the leader of the Spanish contingent was wary of 
their tale, believing that the residents of Paracoxi were merely providing their mico an 
opportunity to evade the expedition.54 In this regard, the Spanish leader was quite likely correct. 
As subordinates to the superior to both Ucita and Mocoço, the people of Paracoxi were surely 
aware of the Spanish proclivity for seemingly unprovoked violence and destruction, as well as 
the relationship that the Spaniards had established with Mocoço, whose interest in increasing his 
regional power might have been a cause for concern within Paracoxi. By attempting to deny the 
Spaniards access to their mico and their settlement, the people of Paracoxi were protecting the 
status of their mico in the region and, through this, the status they gained through affiliation with 
him. As Spanish chroniclers of the expedition reveal in their descriptions of provinces to which 
the Spaniards had more prolonged access, Native commoners sometimes possessed a strong 
sense of pride and personal authority derived from the regional power that their chiefdom 
possessed.55  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 Ranjel, 259; Elvas, 63-4. 
55 To Spaniards, the people from the province of Apalache appeared offended at any suggestion that they might be 
from another province. “Not one of them denied being from Apalache for fear of death. And upon taking one, when 
they asked him where he was from, he responded with pride: ‘Where am I from? … I am an Indian of Apalache,’ 
like one who gave to understand that he took offense from whoever might think that he was of another people but 
Apalache.” Ranjel, 267. 
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The people of Paracoxi managed to prevent the Spaniards from ever entering their 
settlement, and they simultaneously used their access to the Spaniards to manipulate the 
expedition’s route. The Spanish contingent asked the representatives from Paracoxi if they knew 
of any gold in the region. The people of Paracoxi informed the Spaniards that the province of 
Cale, which was situated almost due north of their settlement, possessed gold in abundance. 
They emphasized that Cale was a hostile province, suggesting a motivation for undermining Cale 
by sending the Spaniards there. The residents of Paracoxi used their own knowledge of regional 
power and geography to shape Spanish understandings of the space in ways that advantaged 
them and disadvantaged their enemies. Although the leader of the Spanish contingent was quite 
skeptical of their tale—so much so that he kidnapped and shackled the representatives from 
Paracoxi—de Soto and others within the expedition were enthusiastic about the suggestion to 
travel to Cale.56 
By motivating the expedition to travel to another province, the people of Paracoxi 
effected real benefits to their province. In the interest of hastening their arrival in Cale, the 
Spaniards passed through Paracoxi without causing much of a disturbance. The remaining 
settlements subordinate to Paracoxi also helped ensure that the Spaniards left the province 
quickly, trailing the Spanish contingent as it headed toward Cale and even staging a surprise 
attack.57 At the final settlement before the river that separated Paracoxi from Cale, the residents 
had abandoned their settlement prior to Spanish arrival, as the people of Ucita had before them. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 Elvas, 63-4; Biedma, 226. 
57 However, it was not only intentional efforts that made the space of Paracoxi increasingly dangerous to Spanish 
presence, but also how the Spaniards interpreted this space. To the Spaniards, the province’s topography was 
fraught. The region was relatively poor in provisions, or at least appeared so to the Spaniards, and they were forced 
to survive on greens and un-ripened corn that they managed to scavenge from the local people. Simultaneously, the 
expedition came to understand that Native-made roads reflected regional power dynamic. The sheer size of the roads 
that led to Cale implied increased traffic in that province. The Spaniards realized that increased regional power 
likely meant a greater foundation of resources, which made the Spaniards all the more resolved to leave Paracoxi for 
the presumed wealth of Cale. See: Ranjel, 260. 
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Yet unlike the residents of Ucita, these people hid themselves in a shallow lake not far from their 
settlement. As soon as the Spaniards came upon their location, the people of this unnamed town 
revealed themselves and immediately made diplomatic overtures, offering a guide to the 
Spaniards for their passage into Cale. As Spanish accounts include no mention of any difficulties 
on the remainder of the trip into Cale, this guide was likely quite cooperative in helping the 
Spaniards remove themselves from the province of Paracoxi.58 That Native people were 
generally capable of concealing themselves from an expedition fully unfamiliar with the 
territory, and that their settlement was located on the divide between two adversarial provinces, 
suggests its residents might not have intended to completely avoid Spanish interaction. Perhaps 
they hoped to appear not as a threat to the Spaniards, but as a vulnerable people willing to 
provide assistance in exchange for their wellbeing. 
 Initially, the people of Cale were quite successful at concealing themselves from the 
Spaniards, suggesting that they had no interest in extending a diplomatic welcome to the 
expedition as Mocoço had. As in previous provinces, the residents were aware of Spanish arrival 
well in advance, most people decided to abandon their settlement and conceal themselves from 
the Spaniards. Indeed, the only residents of these first settlements who had any interaction with 
the expedition were those who inadvertently ventured too close while spying on the visitors.59 
Abandonment was a useful method for Timucuan people to preserve themselves from the risk of 
loss of life to the Spaniards, although this could sometimes come at expense of the structures and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 Elvas, 64-5; Ranjel, 259-60. 
59 Elvas, 65; Ranjel, 261. 
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resources in the settlements, which the Spaniards were as inclined to raid in Cale as in other 
provinces.60  
At the town of Acuera within the province of Cale, the residents watched as Spaniards 
began raiding their fields, which, as the people of Paracoxi had suggested, were more abundant, 
reflective of the increasingly arable land in the northern parts of the peninsula. Residents saw the 
Spaniards strip their fields of all the ripe corn, which suggested that the Spaniards intended to 
winter nearby. If the people of Cale had previously risked the structural integrity of their 
settlements and more modest stores of provisions to avoid interaction with the expedition, that 
the Spaniards had subverted a space so vital to Native sustenance became too much to tolerate. 
Perhaps these onlookers worried that Spanish raiding would undermine their capacity to survive 
the winter, a fact that seemed to outweigh the danger that conflict with the Spaniards could bring. 
Likely at the behest of their mico, the people of Cale twice formed war parties to attack the 
Spaniards as they tried to harvest even more corn from the fields surrounding Acuera.61 
Ultimately, though, it was not the mico’s war parties that saved the people of Cale from 
the threat of more prolonged Spanish presence, but the actions of one unlucky warrior who was 
captured during an attack on the Spaniards. The warrior used his newfound access to the 
Spaniards to shape Spanish knowledge of the region, attempting to direct the Spaniards out of his 
own province, as the people of Paracoxi had done before him. He informed the Spaniards that if 
they traveled seven days, they would reach the province of Apalache, which had a massive 
population and was not lacking in corn to sustain an army. The Apalache that the captive from 
Cale constructed for Spanish imaginations was a place of plenty, and he described it with such 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 Ethridge suggests that this pattern of abandonment was similarly common among the Mississippian peoples in the 
heart of the continent. Robbie Ethridge, From Chicaza to Chickasaw: The European Invasion and the 
Transformation of the Mississippian World, 1540-1715 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2013). 
61 Ranjel, 261; Elvas, 65. 
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high regard that his own province must have seemed impoverished in comparison. The captured 
warrior managed to convince the Spaniards with his tale. Suggestions of Apalache’s abundance 
were sufficient to motivate the Spaniards to travel there, and the Spaniards now reasoned that 
Apalache would be a superior space to set up camp for the winter. Consequently, the people of 
Cale were left in peace, albeit without a sizeable portion of their corn harvest.62 
As the warrior from Cale had exploited the Spaniards’ reliance on Native knowledge to 
benefit his province, a resident of the neighboring province of Potano similarly used Spanish 
unfamiliarity with the region in an effort to undermine the expedition and obtain benefits for 
himself and his people. This man pretended himself to be the mico as a means to instigate a ruse 
against the Spaniards. After asking for the return of twenty-eight people that the Spaniards had 
captured, the pretend mico promised the Spaniards that he would establish peaceful relations, 
provide them with provisions, and give them a guide in return. The pretend mico convincingly 
constructed an idealized space for the Spaniards, which must have seemed a significant contrast 
to the distrust they had encountered in former provinces. By remaining outside his settlement, the 
pretend mico also situated himself at a location where his actual motives and the physical 
indications of his subordinate status might be more easily concealed. Indeed, he must have been 
pleased when the Spaniards seemed convinced by his ruse, as the Spaniards freed the captives, 
although they forced the pretend mico to remain at the Spanish camp that night to ensure they 
received the benefits they were promised.63 
After the pretend mico secured the release of his comrades, he again attempted to exploit 
Spanish unfamiliarity with regional power dynamics to secure freedom for himself. The 
following morning, when the pretend mico was still held captive, a number of armed men 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 Ranjel, 261; Elvas, 65. 
63 Elvas, 66; Ranjel, 262-3. 
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appeared among the trees outside the Spanish camp. The pretend mico assured the Spaniards that 
these armed men would heed his requests, and he asked to be taken to them. When he arrived 
near his people, he turned and immediately attacked the Spaniards. Unfortunately for the pretend 
mico, he was apprehended, although the other armed men successfully escaped. Despite the 
unintentional personal sacrifice that came of this act, by falsely positioning himself in a position 
of power, the pretend mico managed to secure the freedom of his comrades through exploiting 
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CHAPTER 3: Caliquen and Apalache 
While commoners in Paracoxi, Cale, and Potano overwhelmingly reinforced the power of 
their micos and protected their provinces, commoners in Caliquen demonstrated the serious 
implications of using access to the expedition to undermine a mico. In Caliquen, two captives of 
the expedition assisted the Spaniards in accessing hidden food stores and concealed residents, 
which effectively subverted their mico’s control over both his provisions and his subjects. A 
third captive revealed a plot by seven allied micos to attack the expedition. By revealing the 
micos’ plans, this captive allowed the Spaniards to preempt the attack, and as a result the 
Spaniards bested the Native forces. Taken together, the actions of the captives in Caliquen reveal 
both the opportunities that the expedition provided for Native commoners to act on their personal 
interests, and the extent to which micos relied upon the compliance of their subjects to avoid 
destabilization or devastation from Spanish presence. 
***** 
In the neighboring province of Caliquen, commoners who encountered the expedition 
demonstrated a similar capacity to influence the Spaniards as the captured warrior at Cale, yet 
they did so in a manner that disadvantaged, rather than protected, the leaders of that province. 
Like the people of Cale, the people of Caliquen initially avoided contact with the Spaniards. The 
people of the first town surely spied on the expedition as the Spaniards waited for a week at the 
abandoned settlement. The Spaniards were unsure of where to travel and without access to 
anyone able (or perhaps willing) to guide them. The concealed residents worked to avoid the 
Spaniards who searched the area for locals to capture as guides. A man and woman attempted to 
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sneak past the Spaniards to gather corn, but their effort to avoid the expedition failed, and the 
Spaniards captured them. At the request of the Spaniards, the woman revealed the location of 
some of the settlement’s corn stores, thus providing the Spaniards access to provisions that 
otherwise would have sustained Caliquen’s residents. By assisting the Spaniards in locating food 
stores, the woman subverted the mico’s ability to control the provisions that he would normally 
disburse to his subordinates. The man, in turn, led the Spaniards to a location where a number of 
local women were hidden, including one of the mico’s daughters, whom the Spaniards took 
captive. By facilitating in the capture of the women, the captive man was undermining the 
productive capacities of the settlement, effectively removing the mico of control of numerous 
people responsible for both labor and the reproduction of social members. While the matrilineal 
descent practices of Timucuan chiefdoms suggest that the mico’s daughter would have 
technically been a non-noble, for the man to facilitate in the capture of a woman so directly 
connected to his leader must have been a direct insult to that mico’s authority.65 That these 
captives undermined the mico of Caliquen at the request of the Spaniards rather than put up a 
resistance suggests that the man and woman might have already been captives of the province, 
perhaps enslaved in Caliquen and thus lacking any connections to the people there. Or, they 
might have simply been acting in self-interest, drawing on internal fissures within their town that 
preexisted contact with the de Soto expedition.66 
 Even if these first two captives undermined the mico of Caliquen through their 
interaction with the Spaniards, later captives from Caliquen worked to remove the Spaniards 
from their province as a means to protect it from further incursion. Rather than convince the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 Generally, individuals within southeastern chiefdoms inherited nobility through the matriline. However, sons of 
nobles could inherit noble political offices agnatically, thus conferring noble status. Such a mechanism did not exist 
for the daughters of nobles. See: Knight 1990. 
66 Biedma, 226; Elvas, 66-7; Ranjel, 263. 
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Spaniards to leave Caliquen for an enemy province, these captives attempted to deter the 
Spaniards from journeying to the province of Apalache. These residents informed the Spaniards 
that a prior Spanish expedition, which the Spaniards would have recognized as the Narváez 
expedition, had traveled to Apalache, and its participants had been forced to build rafts because 
they could find no more land on which to travel, as Apalache was surrounded on three sides by 
water.67 By combining geography and prior Spanish experience, these captives emphasized that 
Apalache would prove a treacherous space for the Spaniards if they dared travel there. However, 
the speakers raised the stakes even further, suggesting that the Spaniards would be unable to 
survive if they decided to turn back from Apalache, as food was scarce and the locals would 
surely seize all available provisions. Thus, the Spaniards ought to leave the continent altogether, 
returning in the direction they had already traveled. Perhaps these speakers had a relationship 
with Apalache. Or, they simply might have been aware of the prior destruction that the Spaniards 
had wrought on the food supplies of their neighbors and were inclined to steer the Spaniards to a 
destination that would take them away from rather than through their province. The speakers 
might have known that a contingent of Spaniards remained in Cale behind this initial group, and 
the prospect of further Spanish presence in Caliquen might have seemed a substantial risk. Given 
Spanish reliance on Native foodstuffs, that the Spaniards might be convinced to return through 
land they already raided for supplies would also undermine the Spaniards’ capacity to provide 
for themselves, especially given that winter was coming and fields were being cleared. 
Simultaneously, directing the Spaniards to turn around would expose Caliquen’s southern 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67 For more information about the Narváez expedition’s tenure at Apalache, see: Jerald T. Milanich, Florida Indians 
and the Invasion from Europe (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1998), 115-25; Resendez, Ch. 4 and 5. 
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neighbors to the dangers of Spanish presence. The Spaniards were not convinced, however, and 
they remained intent on wintering at Apalache.68 
 For the second time in Caliquen, a captive of the expedition undermined the mico, 
working to the advantage of the Spaniards in the process. After learning his daughter had been 
taken captive, the mico of Caliquen arrived at the expedition’s camp. The captive watched as the 
Spaniards forced the mico to remain there as a means to ensure they extracted the necessary 
guide for travel to Apalache. The captive soon realized that the mico of Caliquen was furtively 
plotting an attack against the Spaniards. Perhaps capturing the mico’s progeny represented such a 
challenge to his status that the mico was inspired to rebel against the expedition rather than 
simply secure his daughter’s return and direct the Spaniards to another province. For three days, 
the captive and the expedition traveled toward Apalache, guided by a member of Caliquen’s elite 
entourage, who spoke positively of what the Spaniards would find in Apalache. The captive 
likely realized that the guide did not intend to help the Spaniards, but to lead them to a location 
where allied micos would send warriors to stage an attack. When the expedition neared 
Napetuca, the location of the planned attack, the captive watched as a messenger arrived, 
representing Uzachile, the mico to whom Caliquen was subordinate. The captive listened as the 
messenger offered Uzachile’s support for de Soto, claiming that Uzachile desired an alliance 
with the Spaniards against Apalache.69 Likely a native of another province with an aversion for 
Caliquen, Uzachile, and their allies, the captive realized his access to knowledge could work to 
his personal advantage. The micos had clearly been remiss to assume that all of the Native 
people within the expedition would support them against the Spaniards, perhaps underestimating 
the extent to which Native commoners acted on their personal interests. Because the captive 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68 Elvas, 65, 67; Ranjel, 262. 
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spoke the same Timucuan dialect as Spanish interpreter Juan Ortiz, he approached the Spaniard, 
warning Ortiz that the micos’ performance of peaceful intentions was merely a ruse. Although 
the captive was surely acting in his own interest, his actions greatly benefitted the Spaniards. 
Because the Spaniards knew of the impending attack, they successfully overpowered the allied 
Native forces, revealing the extent to which an act of subversion by one individual commoner 
could undermine a plot that had emerged of extensive communication, coordination, and 
mobilization by seven micos.70 
 Perhaps the captive watched from a distance as the Native warriors ended the battle by 
retreating to two lakes, hoping to use their knowledge of the environment to subvert the 
Spaniards’ access to them.71 The first lake was fully inaccessible to the Spaniards, and the 
warriors within it managed to avoid capture, allowing them to maintain their freedom despite 
military defeat. Spanish soldiers surrounded the second lake, initiating a standoff that lasted 
through the night, until Juan Ortiz was finally able to persuade the Native warriors within the 
lake to surrender. The common warriors decided to surrender long before the micos did, although 
the Spaniards eventually convinced all but one of the micos to leave the lake. Eventually, the 
warriors from Uzachile entered the lake to physically remove the last remaining mico, Uriutina, 
ending the standoff. That the commoners were willing to surrender first, and that they physically 
overpowered a mico to force his surrender, reflects the precariousness of the coercive power that 
micos possessed over their subordinates. Indeed, the commoners who removed Uriutina from the 
lake listened as Uriutina recited a message to Juan Ortiz, which he desired to be passed to his 
subordinates. The warriors heard Uriutina describe his valor and emphasize that he had only fled 
to the lake to inspire the others within not to surrender. Uriutina further stated that he had only 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70 Elvas, 67-8; Biedma, 226; Ranjel, 264-5. 
71 Ibid. 
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relinquished his freedom out of respect for his allies. The final moments of this mico’s freedom, 
then, reveal the centrality of his people’s opinions of him to the maintenance of his authority. 
Because his power was not individual, but was socially embedded in his lineage, he likely 
possessed an interest in convincing his people to uphold the status of not just himself but his kin, 
even when he was forced to renounce his personal autonomy.72 
 After surrendering to the Spaniards, the common warriors needed to decide how to 
contend with the dominance the Spaniards now exerted over them. The warriors found 
themselves physically bound, while the micos were left untied. That the Spaniards took this risk 
reflects that they hoped to flatter the micos’ elite status, while also demonstrating that they were 
sufficiently in control of the environment and were not afraid of unbound captives. Perhaps 
because the warriors had abandoned their micos in the lake, the micos seemed to have a 
particular interest in continuing to resist the Spaniards’ physical control over them, and one mico 
exploited his mobility to strike Hernando de Soto across the face, drawing blood. To the captive 
warriors who watched this interaction take place, the mico’s exertion of physical power over de 
Soto’s body must have been inspiring. The captive warriors rallied behind their micos, grabbing 
anything that could be used as a weapon to overthrow their Spanish captors.73 To both the micos 
and warriors, this resistance might have seemed a final opportunity to retain their status, for 
within southeastern chiefdoms, captives were treated more as objects than as social beings.74 
While the warriors and micos were unsuccessful at freeing themselves, their resistance did bring 
an end to their captivity. The majority of the captives, including all of the micos, were killed for 
this act of defiance, losing their lives but never becoming slaves to the Spaniards. Only a few 	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adolescent boys were instead bound in chains and given to Spanish masters. That only the 
youngest members of the Native force were permitted to live emphasizes the significance of the 
captive men’s physical resistance in undermining the Spaniards’ sense of control of their own 
camp—only those with the least physical strength were deemed safe enough, a striking contrast 
to micos walking about unchained in the camp.75 
 After the death of so many warriors and micos, nearby towns were forced to contend with 
newfound instability, and although they worked to protect themselves from Spanish incursion, 
they were generally less successful than previous towns. The massive battle might have 
interrupted existing communication networks between settlements, resulting in populations that 
could not as effectively mobilize regional knowledge to protect themselves and subvert Spanish 
interests. At one settlement, residents were completely unaware of impending Spanish arrival, 
scattering haphazardly when the Spaniards appeared nearby. At another town, the residents 
abandoned their homes, but left an unusual abundance of food, which might have suggested that 
they acted with haste to secure themselves before Spanish arrival. At a third town, the Spaniards 
captured one-hundred people, mostly women, an unsurprising gender imbalance given the recent 
death of so many warriors at Napetuca. 76  
Like previous women forced to interact with the expedition, these captives used their 
position as women to undermine the Spaniards. One woman, who was apprehended in the forest 
outside her town, was given to a Spanish soldier. While male captives expected to become 
guides or slaves, female captives had the added risk of sexual servitude, a common practice in 
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the all-male de Soto expedition.77 Resisting the Spaniard’s attempt to dominate her body, the 
woman grabbed her captor by the genitals with enough force to kill him. Her captor screamed, 
severely in pain, which drew the attention of his comrades. Unfortunately for the captive, the 
soldiers that came running to their comrade’s aid thwarted her attempt at escape.78 
The people of the neighboring province of Apalache, who were not involved in the battle 
at Napetuca, appear to have received adequate warning of impending Spanish arrival, which 
allowed residents to undertake efforts to undermine the expedition’s entry into their province. 
Residents of the first settlement within Apalache stationed themselves directly across the river 
that the Spaniards needed to cross to enter the province. The warriors from this town greeted the 
expedition with a hail of arrows, hardly intending to slaughter the Spaniards but instead warning 
them of the dangers they would experience if they dared enter Apalache. When the warriors of 
that town realized that the Spaniards would continue to cross the river despite their efforts, they 
retreated to their settlement and set it ablaze as soon as the Spaniards came within view, ensuring 
that the Spaniards saw the destruction. Given that this settlement was literally the first line of 
defense for Apalache, burning the town was likely not a novel response to enemy incursion. Yet, 
by destroying their settlement, the residents emphasized that the people of Apalache would be 
committed to denying the Spaniards access to the spaces and resources they needed to survive.79 
In Apalache, the residents continued their efforts to undermine the Spaniards. Apalache’s 
aversion to Spanish presence was at least partially informed by negative memories of the 
Narváez expedition ten years prior. The expedition had begun its tenure in Apalache by taking a 	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number of women and children captive, which inspired a series of attacks by the warriors of the 
province. That the Narváez expedition often raided fields and towns for supplies only added to 
the distaste for Spaniards that developed in Apalache.80 Thus, without an alliance, the de Soto 
expedition was forced to rely on uncooperative captive guides who sought to sabotage the 
Spaniards. An elderly man who was tasked with guiding the Spaniards wandered about the 
province, acting completely lost in what must have been familiar surroundings. A female guide 
soon replaced him, and she led the Spaniards to a town that had already been abandoned. By 
acting confused, the man, like previous guides, delayed Spanish arrival at this town, providing its 
residents more time to prepare themselves for Spanish incursion.81 After the Spaniards set up 
camp for the winter, the residents of Apalache continued to ensure that the expedition’s tenure in 
the province was as unhappy as possible, as they had for the Narváez expedition. Twice Native 
people sneaked past Spanish guards to set fire to the settlement where the Spaniards had set up 
camp for the winter. Repeatedly, small contingents of warriors ambushed Spaniards who dared 
leave their encampment. Once, as Spaniards were traveling down a road with provisions that 
they had raided from Native fields, a group of warriors attacked them, forcing the Spaniards to 
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It was after this harsh winter at Apalache, during which the majority of Native people 
held captive by the Spaniards died, that the young Perico stepped forward from among the 
survivors with an offer to lead the expedition to his supposed homeland, Cofitachequi. He 
convinced the Spaniards that the province held an abundance of gold. The Spaniards were quick 
to believe him, and Perico soon gained relative authority as the primary guide for the expedition, 
tasked with leading the Spaniards out of Apalache and to the east.83 Initially, Perico was quite 
successful, and he must have been pleased with the authority he received as the expedition’s 
primary guide. Perico was able to assist the Spaniards as they traveled through the first provinces 
after Apalache, even leading the expedition to an island town in the province of Chisi, where the 
expedition successfully surprised the residents, allowing the Spaniards to procure an unusual 
wealth of provisions.84  
Yet Perico became increasingly nervous as the expedition moved closer to Cofitachequi, 
as it became apparent that the Spaniards placed incredible faith in his abilities. Perico and the 
expedition encountered a number of micos who considered the province of Cofitachequi their 
enemy. The micos offered their subordinates to assist the expedition, hoping that their kindness 
toward the Spaniards would translate to destabilization for Cofitachequi. Yet the micos also 
warned that the province was incredibly difficult to reach, surrounded by empty land without any 	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roads, although there were certain hidden pathways that armies used when the provinces were at 
war. Perico might have worried when the Spaniards were unmoved by these warnings, for they 
were still focused on the gold they expected to find in Cofitachequi and were confident that 
Perico could successfully guide them through the uninhabited land, given that he claimed to be a 
native of the province.85 Before the expedition set out for the uninhabited region, Perico began to 
writhe and foam at the mouth, seemingly having fallen under a demonic possession so 
convincing that a priest who accompanied the expedition prayed over him to rid him of the 
malady.86 Perico recovered, however, and was still expected to remain as the primary guide to 
Cofitachequi.  
When the expedition set out across the uninhabited land, Perico claimed that the trip 
would take only three days. However, the journey continued for much longer, as Cofitachequi 
was more than 150 miles away. Perico must have realized that the Spaniards were becoming 
skeptical of his purported knowledge of the region. By the ninth day, skepticism had turned to 
rage, and de Soto personally threatened Perico, saying he would throw him to the dogs for 
misguiding the Spaniards on their journey. Yet despite de Soto’s threats, Perico would have been 
somewhat comforted to know that his life was secure. Perico was the only Native member of the 
expedition who spoke a variety of dialects and could communicate with Juan Ortiz, meaning that 
even if the Spaniards no longer relied on Perico for his knowledge of the region, they still needed 
to employ him as a translator. It might have been this sense to security that motivated Perico to 
finally admit that he no longer knew where he was.87  
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After his admission, Perico likely waited at the Spanish camp as de Soto commanded 
four contingents to search for local people who could help the expedition access provisions or 
information about the primary settlement of Cofitachequi, where the Spaniards still expected to 
find gold. Luckily for Perico, the Spaniards managed to capture a few locals who spoke the 
language he shared with Juan Ortiz. Perico and Ortiz spoke with the captives together, and the 
captives agreed to share the location of a nearby town. Perico’s ability and willingness to 
communicate with these captives restored some of the Spaniards’ trust in him. As the other 
Spanish contingents returned with more captives, Perico must have waited anxiously, hoping that 
someone could lead the Spaniards to the location he had promised. The first contingent returned 
with captives who were committed to protecting their leader, as they refused to disclose any 
information to help the Spaniards in their travels. When the Spaniards put the captives to death 
for their insubordination, Perico must have worried that he would eventually face a similarly 
violent fate. Yet after another Spanish contingent returned with a woman who agreed to lead the 
Spaniards to Cofitachequi, Perico must have been thoroughly relieved.88 
Once in Cofitachequi, Perico worked to ensure that he could preserve his life despite his 
diminishing utility to the expedition. Perico asked to be baptized, and after he became a Christian 
the Spaniards unchained him, which allowed him to move about freely for the first time since his 
capture at Napetuca. While the mica of the province of Cofitachequi had welcomed the 
Spaniards and offered them pearls in the interest of establishing good relations, the unsatisfied 
Spaniards continued to pressure Perico to reveal the location of the gold of which he had spoken. 
In response, Perico informed the Spaniards that the town to which captive woman had led them 
was merely the first town of his province, and the Spaniards had not yet reached the wealthiest 
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settlement. None of the residents of Cofitachequi claimed to know of such a place, although they 
surely would have had motive to conceal it. Instead, informants from Cofitachequi directed the 
expedition elsewhere, northwest to the province of Coste. Unsuccessful in their search for gold in 
the province, the Spaniards eventually became convinced that Perico had only heard stories of 
Cofitachequi secondhand. Perico had not spoken of his distant homeland, but he had instead 
constructed a false narrative of this space, elaborating on its wealth to encourage Spanish 
desires.89 
The Spaniards were quite likely correct—Perico had constructed a tale based on rumors 
rather than experience. Yet, in doing so, Perico had also situated himself in a position of relative 
privilege within the expedition. His reasoned responses to the increasingly tenuous realities of 
his condition, such as his possession and supposed interest in becoming a Christian, served as a 
means to secure his continued survival, even as his tale slowly began to unravel. Although Perico 
continued to work as a translator in Cofitachequi, when Juan Ortiz died soon after the Spaniards 
left the province, Perico was replaced with another guide more familiar with the region. After his 
replacement, Perico disappears from the sources, and the outcome of his extended ploy is 
uncertain. Because the Spaniards made no mention of Perico’s death at the hands of the 
expedition, and because his recent conversion would complicate killing him, it is fully possible 
that Perico ultimately survived his lengthy captivity.90 
Although Perico is the only Native commoner named in the chronicles of the de Soto 
expedition, he was merely one of many who shaped the expedition’s tenure on the continent. As 
intermediaries between Native societies and the new arrivals, Native commoners served as the 	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means through which the Spaniards could gain access to and knowledge of Native spaces, and by 
extension the resources the Spaniards needed if they were to succeed in their imperial project and 
establish a lasting presence in the region. Because the de Soto expedition represented a challenge 
to micos’ power, Native commoners could simultaneously subvert or augment their mico’s 
authority through their interactions with the expedition. Hardly powerless, Native commoners in 
these hierarchical chiefdoms were integral to shaping, reproducing, and challenging both intra- 
and inter-societal power dynamics.   
Native commoners’ sensemaking of early contact also occurred in the context of 
individual and societal trauma. Scholarship has recognized the de Soto expedition as devastating 
to the Native societies of the North American Southeast.91 Native commoners experienced 
violence, became temporary captives or permanent slaves, and faced exposure to pathogens to 
which they lacked immunity. Contact, then, reshaped the world of Native commoners just as 
they shaped the world of contact.92 Indeed, in the following years, many chiefdoms gradually re-
formed into more egalitarian polities, the product of revolutionary transformations to 
sociopolitical systems made by individuals like those commoners who interacted with the de 
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Soto expedition.93 A transition to more egalitarian social organization from a hierarchy grounded 
in elite dominance over human, natural, and sacred resources was a process of remaking 
inevitably situated in the shifting beliefs of the commoners who constituted the demographic 
majority of these polities. Native commoners’ sensemaking, then, was central to social 
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